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Consider, in particular, his suggestion that we might select our situa-
tions in order to improve our character. Here, he approvingly cites John 
Doris’s famous example of being invited to a secluded dinner party with 
a flirtatious colleague while one’s spouse is away. Obviously, going to the 
dinner and trusting your virtue to rescue you from cheating is not the smart 
thing to do; the smart thing is to decline the invitation (Lack of Character 
[Cambridge University Press, 2002], 147). Miller agrees. And, of course, so 
should we. Avoiding the dinner may well help us avoid acting badly.
But Miller is making the further claim—a claim for which Doris himself 
was not arguing—that avoiding the dinner may also help us to become 
better people. And it is not obvious to me how that is supposed to work. 
The alcoholic who avoids bars is surely wise; he is almost just as surely still 
an alcoholic. Merely avoiding the “near occasion of sin” hasn’t cured him 
of the desire to drink alcohol. Likewise, the partnered person who avoids 
candlelit dinners with colleagues is surely wise; but she is not thereby 
made a more virtuous person—at least not if virtue is a disposition of the 
heart, as Miller thinks that it is. Perhaps the hope is that simply avoiding 
adultery eventually makes it less attractive. But it isn’t as if avoiding for-
bidden fruit always makes the fruit less attractive. Quite to the contrary. 
So I think we need to hear more about how this strategy would work.
Of course, none of the three questions I have raised are intended as 
decisive objections to Miller’s project; they are instead invitations to fur-
ther elaboration. It is a mark of a good book to raise more questions than 
it can itself answer. And this is a very good book indeed. A final note on 
audience: while this book is not written for professional philosophers 
or psychologists, it would nonetheless be appropriate for use in certain 
academic contexts. My own university, for example, has recently begun 
offering interdisciplinary seminars to first year students with the aim of 
exemplifying how the methodologies typical of empirical science and eth-
ical thought, for example, can fruitfully interact. The Character Gap could 
serve as an ideal text for such a course.
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God’s Own Ethics: Norms of Divine Agency and the Argument from Evil , by 
Mark C. Murphy. Oxford University Press, 2017. Pp. 224. $70.00 (hard-
cover).
KYLA EBELS-DUGGAN, Northwestern University
In God’s Own Ethics, Mark Murphy argues that traditional formulations of 
the problem of evil rely on unwarranted presumptions about the ethics of 
the God whose existence they purport to disprove. The argument has two 
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major parts. The first aims to establish the ethics of a perfect being as such: 
which considerations would a perfect being necessarily treat as reasons for 
action? After developing and defending an answer, Murphy argues that 
the evils that we observe provide no significant evidence against the ex-
istence of such a being. The second part aims to establish the more ambi-
tious conclusion that these evils also fail to provide evidence against the 
existence of a perfect being worthy of our worship and allegiance, and so 
the God to whom the Abrahamic religions attest.
Murphy’s argument, exemplary in clarity and attention to detail, cen-
ters on the relationships among the concept of a perfect being—which 
Murphy calls the Anselmian Being—the demands of what he calls familiar 
welfare-oriented goodness, and the evils that we observe. Along the intricate 
and tightly woven course of the book, Murphy also touches on other im-
portant themes, including the proper methodology for reasoning about 
God’s perfection, the relationships among love, practical reasons, and mo-
rality, and the conditions for rational allegiance.
In Part I, Murphy advances three claims about the ethics of the An-
selmian Being: The Anselmian Being would not necessarily be motivated 
by familiar welfare-oriented goodness, but would necessarily refrain from 
intending setbacks to rational creatures’ welfare, and would take that 
welfare to provide justifying, though not requiring, reasons to advance it. 
Familiar welfare-oriented goodness is a normative ethical view that takes 
the welfare of rational creatures to be among the values to which a morally 
good agent responds. And it demands a certain kind of response, namely 
treating setbacks to well-being as to-be-prevented. The morally good 
agent fails to prevent such setbacks only when she has good reason to do 
so. Standard formulations of the problem of evil presume this conception 
of moral goodness when they argue that a perfect being would not allow 
the sorts of suffering that are manifestly part of our world. But Murphy 
argues that perfection does not entail this regard for welfare, but only the 
more limited responses articulated in the second and third theses.
He begins by arguing that the Anselmian Being is not necessarily loving 
in any sense that outstrips what is needed to count as perfectly morally 
good. Like familiar welfare-oriented goodness, love responds to the wel-
fare of its object. But any rationally necessitated response to this value is 
already included in moral goodness. The Anselmian Being acts necessarily 
only on necessary reasons. So the perfection of being loving can add noth-
ing to the necessary ethics of the Anselmian Being, beyond whatever ethics 
moral goodness entails.
Next, Murphy turns to the more ambitious thesis that the Anselmian 
Being is not necessarily morally good in the familiar welfare-oriented 
sense. Establishing the authority of that normative view requires a move 
from X is good (bad) for some A to X provides reasons for anyone to promote 
(prevent) X. But all plausible attempts to defend the move in the case 
where X is the welfare of some creature and “anyone” ranges over human 
beings appeal to features of human beings that the Anselmian Being does 
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not necessarily share. So these arguments provide no reason to believe 
that the Anselmian Being has these reasons.
Nevertheless, Murphy affirms that the Anselmian Being is perfectly 
good and responsive to well-being at a higher level of abstraction. The 
Anselmian Being’s perfection entails that it must be the source of the value 
of all other valuable things. So creatures can be valuable only extrinsically, 
in virtue of our relationship to the Anselmian Being. This, he argues, af-
fects the kind of reasons that our value can give the Anselmian Being. Just 
as the Anselmian Being has discretion about whether to create beings who 
have a good, so it has discretion about whether to add an extra measure of 
well-being to our lives. The Anselmian Being needs no reason not to do so, 
but the value of the beings and of their welfare provides justifying reasons 
on which the Anselmian Being could choose to act.
Moreover, the Anselmian Being has decisive, requiring reasons not to 
intend setbacks to well-being. Such setbacks are an evil. The Anselmian 
Being would not intend evil as an end; if such a being could intend evil 
at all, it would only be as a means to some good. But, without justifying 
reasons, making the achievement of evil the success condition of one’s act 
makes that act worse than it would otherwise be. Moreover, there could be 
no such reasons, because no good that could be so realized could justify the 
marring of the Aneslemian Being’s agency through the intending of evil. 
So the Anselmian Being has decisive requiring reasons not to intend evil.
While the Anselmian Being thus never aims to set back creaturely well-
being, neither does it necessarily aim to advance or to prevent setbacks to 
it. We have no reason to suppose that the existence of such a being would 
entail or predict a world with fewer or different evils than we observe. So 
the argument from evil fails to undermine the thesis that a perfect being 
exists.
In the second half of the book, Murphy turns to the worry that the 
conclusions of Part I amount to cold comfort for adherents of the Abra-
hamic traditions. For, one might think, there is a yawning gap between 
the Anselmian Being imagined here and the loving God revealed in the 
scriptures. Even if the argument from evil fails to establish that no perfect 
being exists, it may yet succeed in establishing that observed suffering 
provides good reason to think that there is no God worthy of our worship 
and allegiance.
Murphy dispenses quickly with worries about worship-worthiness, 
claiming that this feature follows from the Anselmian Being’s perfection. 
He takes more seriously the challenge that suffering poses to the possi-
bility that God is worthy of allegiance. As he puts it, the worry is that 
“What precludes the argument from evil from getting purchase against 
the Anselmian Being—that the Anselmian Being’s ethics is not necessarily 
the ethics of rational creatures—also precludes the Anselmian Being from 
being necessarily worthy of allegiance” (147).
To deserve allegiance, Murphy holds, God must have an ethics 
sufficiently like our own. That is, God must treat as reasons certain 
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considerations that we treat as reasons. Part I has shown that God will not 
necessarily do so just in virtue of being perfect. But a perfect being could 
choose to take on these reasons contingently. Murphy contends that the 
Abrahamic scriptures and traditions attest to a God who has done just 
that. Human beings can choose to take on commitments that change the 
normative status of certain considerations, rendering them reasons. God 
shares this normative power. Like us, God may take on reasons by adopt-
ing discretionary ends or—most significantly, given the scriptural narra-
tives—making promises or covenants with creatures.
But to turn back the problem of evil, Murphy must go further, estab-
lishing that God’s chosen ethics can make God worthy of our allegiance, 
while yet remaining consistent with the evils that we observe. If, for ex-
ample, only a being motivated by familiar welfare-oriented goodness 
could be worthy of allegiance, then the original version of the argument 
from evil returns. But Murphy denies the antecedent. He holds that fa-
miliar welfare-oriented goodness governs human beings, and also that in 
order to be worthy of our allegiance God needs to share in our reasons 
to a sufficient extent. But God need not have exactly the same ethics as 
human creatures to be worthy of allegiance. Instead, he argues, we would 
have reason to ally ourselves with and subordinate our wills to God if: (1) 
God will never direct us to act in ways that come into conflict with our 
first-order obligations, including those given by familiar welfare-oriented 
goodness, and (2) We would do better in securing our reasonable ends by 
subordinating our wills than by acting on our own judgment or in some 
other way. Murphy offers three models of this possibility, each a possible 
political authority that, he claims, we would have reason to empower and 
accept. The models make clear that God could make and keep promises 
that the two conditions will be met, without being motivated to maximize 
the welfare of creatures. So the existence of evils that God could have pre-
vented provides no evidence against God’s allegiance-worthiness.
Murphy concludes by arguing that the scriptures represent God as 
making the relevant sort of covenants with us, promising us great goods—
and in particular that all will be well for us in the end—if we subordinate 
our wills to God’s will. But they do not represent God as taking on familiar 
welfare-oriented goodness. The book ends with an argument that Mur-
phy’s account of God’s ethics makes better sense than any of its competi-
tors can of the central Christian doctrine that God loves us even though 
God doesn’t have to.
In at least one important way I make an unhelpfully sympathetic audi-
ence for Murphy’s claims about God’s ethics. No doubt some will resist 
his argument on the grounds that God couldn’t depart so far from the 
moral ideals that govern us, yet still count as perfectly good. Such readers 
might seek an account that makes God more beholden to look out for our 
well-being. But I have doubts about the extent to which we bear this sort 
of responsibility even to one another. Murphy treats it as uncontroversial 
that familiar welfare-oriented goodness governs human beings. If correct, 
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this makes his claims that the Anselmian Being is not necessarily mor-
ally good in this sense, and that God need not be even contingently so, 
more interesting. But, while I find these conclusions about God’s ethics 
plausible, I take them to be insights into the right way to understand moral 
goodness, rather than revealing the distance between our ethics and God’s.
Murphy may not like this characterization, but I find it helpful to un-
derstand him as suggesting that God is less consequentialist than we 
might have thought, and instead more like a Kantian. God needn’t look to 
maximize creaturely well-being, nor even take the advancement of well-
being as a reason to act, at each possible moment. As I would put it, God 
need not take responsibility for our well-being in the way that consequen-
tialism requires. Instead, the ethics that Murphy ascribes to God combines 
a certain requirement of respect, the limiting condition of not aiming to 
set back well-being, with something much like the Kantian wide duty to 
advance the happiness of others, regarding advancement of human flour-
ishing as providing justifying reasons. The further thought that God may 
choose to convert some justifying reasons to requiring reasons by making 
promises also fits comfortably within a Kantian scheme. So if Kantian 
normative ethics is close to the truth about the reasons governing human 
beings, the gulf between God’s ethics and ours is plausibly much narrower 
than Murphy suggests.
Murphy’s general conception of moral goodness, appropriate respon-
siveness to value (23), is initially neutral with respect to both which values 
and which responses are in question. He then specifies the notion, hold-
ing that creaturely welfare must be among the relevant values, and that, 
at least for human beings, the required responses are those comprising 
familiar welfare-oriented goodness. But Murphy offers little defense of 
these specifications, and one might doubt that goodness requires treating 
the welfare of human or sentient beings as valuable, at least as intrinsically 
so. One might, for example, hold that the value of the beings themselves, 
not that of their welfare, immediately guides morally good responses. In 
a slightly later formulation (29), Murphy adds persons to the values re-
sponse to which is included in moral goodness. But a stretch of argument 
is required to move from the idea of valuing a person to valuing her wel-
fare. I have elsewhere argued against this way of thinking of our reasons, 
not just with respect to other persons generally, but even concerning those 
we love (Kyla Ebels-Duggan, “Against Benificence: A Normative Account 
of Love,” Ethics 119 [2008]: 142–170).
Murphy drives the wedge between his conceptions of human and di-
vine goodness in chapter 3, where he argues for the apparently shocking 
thesis that the Anselmian Being is not necessarily morally good. But his 
argument might be taken to cast doubt on the claim that familiar welfare-
oriented goodness is the best conception of moral goodness, rather than 
supporting his narrower stated thesis that this conception doesn’t apply to 
the Anselmian Being. How shocking the thesis of chapter 3, and so of the 
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book as a whole, is depends on how satisfactory this “familiar” concep-
tion of moral goodness turns out to be.
I concur with Murphy’s claim that the move from X is good (bad) for A 
to there is a reason for anyone to promote (prevent) X needs defense. But note 
that such defense is needed as the claim ranges over all agents, including 
human ones. Murphy briefly surveys Hobbesian, Humean, Aristotelian 
and Kantian attempts to bridge the argumentative gap. We can ask both 
whether these arguments succeed in establishing that familiar welfare-
oriented goodness governs human beings and, if so, whether they do so 
in a way that extends to the Anselmian Being. Murphy is focused on the 
second of these questions, but the first deserves some attention.
I do not think that the Hobbesian or Humean strategies succeed in the 
former task, so I will set them aside. The Aristotelian approach probably 
has the best chance of yielding the conclusion Murphy endorses about the 
difference between our ethics and God’s; it might deserve more detailed 
development. My worry emerges in consideration of the Kantian argu-
ment. Murphy interprets the Kantian as claiming that there are no rel-
evant, non-arbitrary differences among rational agents such that we could 
value ourselves, taking our own ends to be reason-giving, yet fail to value 
others. His response is that there are very important differences between 
human agents and the Anselmian Being. The latter is perfect and not just 
“one person among others.” But the best version of the Kantian argument 
has it that valuing ourselves qua rational agent is entailed by the activi-
ties of choice and action, and these also fix the description under which 
we must value ourselves. If this strategy works, then it isn’t clear why the 
admittedly vast differences between our agency and perfect divine agency 
would make the kind of difference that Murphy suggests. So long as we 
both choose and act—and this does not seem to be something that Mur-
phy wants to deny—the Kantian conclusion will apply to us both.
The content of this conclusion is another matter. In 3.4 Murphy argues 
that even having established that creaturely well-being grounds reasons, 
we must still ask what these reasons are. They are not necessarily reasons 
to promote, but perhaps only to respect, well-being, and might be merely 
justifying rather than requiring. But why treat these questions as arising 
only with respect to the Anselmian Being’s ethics, ignoring the human 
case? Above I suggested that Kantians will endorse conclusions about 
human ethics similar to those Murphy ascribes to the Anselmian Being. 
The normative upshots of the other three strategies with respect to human 
ethics deserve further consideration as well.
Murphy’s arguments toward the end of the book provide further rea-
son to suspect greater similarity between human and divine ethics than 
he suggests. Concerned to demonstrate the possible existence of the God 
of the Abrahamic scriptures, he looks for models on which it would be 
sensible to trust an authority not motivated by familiar welfare-oriented 
goodness. But the models that he presents are possible human political 
authorities. The power of these models does not depend on anything 
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distinctive of divine agency. If convincing, they show that we could have 
reason to ally ourselves with, even subordinate our wills to, other human 
persons who do not subscribe to familiar welfare-oriented goodness.
Moreover, his culminating case that his view outdoes competitors in 
accounting for the central Christian orthodoxy that God loves us, though 
God doesn’t have to would be more persuasive if tied to familiar models 
of human love. I think that this route is open to him. In my view, just as 
human ethics is probably more like the divine ethics that Murphy defends, 
so ideals of human love share more with his conception of divine love. 
Alongside analogs to political authority, Murphy might have considered 
comparisons with models of parental love.
To put my central point in a friendlier way, Murphy has more resources 
than he uses to display the possibility of a compelling God—worthy of 
worship, allegiance and even love—who nevertheless departs from fa-
miliar welfare-oriented goodness. Murphy’s God can seem an unpleasant 
character, who demands obedience in a way that looks arbitrary, or uses a 
superior position to extract allegiance through a kind of bribery. Murphy 
works to tamp down this impression, rightly emphasizing appealing as-
pects of God’s character that the view accommodates and makes salient. 
But there is more that he can say along these lines, and the closer that we 
can come to understanding God as sharing, rather than departing from, 
motivations we recognize as good in human beings, the less trouble this 
sort worry will cause.
I have focused on just one of many possible lines of response to 
Murphy’s rich and intricate argument. Like any good philosophical work, 
God’s Own Ethics raises many questions even as it provides important in-
sights. The book is a true achievement worthy of careful study and much 
discussion.
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Exemplarist Moral Theory , by Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski. Cambridge Uni-
versity Press, 2017. Pp. vi + 288. $57.35 (hardcover).
RICHARD KIM, Loyola University Chicago
In every area of philosophy, novel theories are rare. In normative ethics, 
for instance, the theoretical terrain seems well mapped out by deontology, 
consequentialism, and virtue ethics. While fine-tuning and adjustments of 
each theory continue, it is not easy to find a theory of morality that doesn’t 
fall within these three categories. For this reason alone Linda Zagzebski’s 
proposal of a new moral theory, “exemplarist moral theory” (EMT), is an 
extraordinary achievement. (Note: in earlier works she takes exemplarism 
